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LISA D. BROWN*

The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District's Protected Water Rights:
Legal, Beneficial, or Against the Public

Interest in New Mexico?
ABSTRACT
Lately, one can hardly avoid reading in any local newspaper one
viewpoint or another bearingon competing uses for New Mexico's
water. However, as increasingdemands viefor water essential to
environmental,agricultural,and culturalneeds, the largestsurface
water rights holder in New Mexico diverts water from the Rio
Grande in unaccountable quantities, dividing these interests
againstone another. The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
is a quasi-publicagency protectedfrom the loss of its water rights
by its enabling legislation. This protectionflies in the face of the
fundamental public nature of water ownershiparticulated in the
New Mexico Constitution. This articleassertsthat the Middle Rio
GrandeConservancy District'sprotection is unconstitutional,and,
at the very least, contrary to public welfare values. In fact, the
articleargues, much of the state's most valuable naturalresource
is under essentiallyprivate control, against the public interest in
New Mexico. The legislature therefore has a duty to rectify this
situation.
INTRODUCTION
While rising demands for New Mexico's water result in proposals
for legislation that would threaten the viability of northern New Mexico's
acequial communities, current interpretations of state law provide a
statutory shield2 for the water rights of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District (District) against claims that it has abandoned or forfeited its

* Associate, Nordhaus Law Firm, Albuquerque, New Mexico; J.D. (1998), University
of New Mexico School of Law.

1. See JosE A. RIvERA, AcEQUIA CULTURE: WATER, LAND, AND COMMUNITY IN THE
SouTHwEsT 227 (1998) (defining acequia as a ditch or irrigation canal, can also refer to the

ditch association in a community).
2. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-17-21 (Michie 1978).
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water rights.3 The District's diversion of vast quantities of water from the
Rio Grande forces competition for the use of water, most notably from
environmental groups that advocate minimum instream flows and seek to
limit the quantity of an agricultural water right to consumptive use.
However, the parciantes"of acequias depend upon additional water in the
form of diversion rights for creating a "head" on a stream to clear acequias
of debris and create enough force to efficiently deliver water to their crops.
New claims for water persistently threaten traditional agricultural
practices of the state's subsistence farmers, whose communal acequias carry
the lifeblood of a recognized cultural value in New Mexico. A close look
at the District's practices, however, may reveal that recent diversions from
the Rio Grande deplete the river without benefiting agricultural interests
in the Middle Rio Grande Valley. Despite a declining agricultural base, the
District
has diverted increasingly more water from the river in recent
6
years.
The District operates on a presumption that it cannot lose its water
rights for nonuse. This presumption may prove to be unconstitutional and
against the public interest of New Mexico, and may prove ultimately to be
bad for both its people and its environment. This article looks at the
District's enabling legislation against the backdrop of New Mexico water
law and policy.
First, the article examines the implications of New Mexico's
constitutional declaration that water is a public resource to be managed by
the state under the concepts of the public trust doctrine. Next, it lays the
historical groundwork surrounding the District's creation and its purposes,
suggesting that New Mexico statutory law provides an additional
legislative mandate to protect the public welfare in water management and
allocation. The article then analyzes particular clauses in the state's
constitution to determine whether the District's exemption from the state's
forfeiture statute is either legal or beneficial. Finally, it argues that the
District currently operates against the public interest, and accordingly, that
the State has a duty to end what is essentially private control over a public
resource.

3. A water right in New Mexico may be abandoned where it has not been put to
beneficial use for many years and it can be shown that the owner does not intend to use it.
The New Mexico surface water forfeiture statute, which has no element of intent, is codified
at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28 (Michie 1978).
4. See RIVERA, supra note 1, at 230 (defining parcianteas a member of the acequia
association; this contemporary term derives from the partitioning of land and water rights).
5. See Sleeper v. Ensenada Land &Water Ass'n, No. RA 84-53, slip op. at 6 (N.M. Dist.
Ct. Apr. 16,1985), rev'd on othergrounds, In re Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
6.

See ERNIE NIma &ToM McGucxcN, WATER MANAGEMENT STUDY: UPPER RIO GRANDE

BASIN 86 (1997).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING NEW
MEXICO'S WATER
Water is a precious and limited resource in the arid west, and New
Mexico's Constitution, like those of other western states, provides an
explicit framework for allocating the state's water 7 The New Mexico
Constitution recognizes and confirms all rights existing at the time of
statehood for "any useful or beneficial purpose."' It declares unappropriated waters of the state to belong to the public, subject to appropriation for
beneficial use,9 with priority of appropriation having the better right.'
Finally, the Constitution proclaims that "beneficial use shall be the basis,
the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water.""
The New Mexico Constitution's explicit declaration that the state's
waters belong to the public is perhaps the most striking recognition of the
necessity to conserve New Mexico's invaluable water. The New Mexico
Supreme Court has articulated the principles of the public trust doctrine to
be imposed on decision makers allocating this essential resource: 2 "we
already had a policy, also time-honored, as to waters. We had nationalized
them. Not as a source of public revenue, as minerals are retained for
royalties; but as an elemental necessity, like air, which must not be allowed
to fall under private contro " '
In addition to asserting the basic principles governing water use in
New Mexico, the Constitution authorizes the legislature to exercise the
state's police power to protect the health and welfare of the people with
legal provisions "for the organization and operation of drainage districts
and systems."" With that foundation, the legislature passed laws governing both drainage and irrigation districts in relationship with federal
reclamation projects."5 Outside of federal projects, the Drainage District

7. N.M. CONsr. art. XVI is titled "Irrigation and Water Rights."
8. N.L CONsT. art. XVI, § 1.
9. The concept of beneficial use "requires actual use for some purpose that is socially
accepted as beneficial." State ex rel. Martinez v. McDermett, 901 P.2d 745,748 (N.M. Ct. App.

1995).
10. See N.M. CONST. art. XVI,
11.

N.M. CoNsT. art. XVI,

§ 2.

§ 3.

12. See Threlkeld v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
Otero County, 15 P.2d 671 (N.M.
1932).

13. Id.at673.
14. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 4.
15. An Act Providing for the Organization, Conduct, Management, and Control of
Drainage Districts upon Federal Reclamation Projects and for Co-Operation between Such
Districts and the United States Government, 1917 N.M. Laws 22 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 73-8-1 to -60 (Michie 1978)) (Drainage Districts within Federal Reclamation Projects); An

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

Act16 allowed the local formation of districts; the Acequia Act17 governed
acequias' irrigation practices; the Water Users Association Act 8 allowed
individual ditches and landowners to form associations for pooling
resources for building dams or other large works beneficial to members;
and the Irrigation District Act'9 gave individual landowners the ability to
provide for funding of irrigation works through assessments based on
benefits. These acts all existed prior to the passage of the New Mexico
Conservancy Act' (Conservancy Act) in 1923.
The Conservancy Act authorized the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District's organization. In 1925 the second judicial district court of
New Mexico created the District by court order.2 Unlike acequia and
irrigation district laws, which relied on a democratic process for the
formation of districts, the original Conservancy Act provided that the
organizing petition be signed "either by one hundred (100) owners of land,
or by a majority of the owners of the land situate within the limits of the
territory proposed to be organized into a district."' Organizers of the
District in 1923 founded it on the force of only 148 signatures.2?
THE CLIMATE SURROUNDING PASSAGE OF THE
CONSERVANCY ACT
These landowners sought to protect and enhance the value of their
investments by draining saturated lands in the Middle Rio Grande Valley
and controlling periodic floods. During the late nineteenth century,
development of irrigated agriculture in the San Luis Valley of Colorado

Act Providing for Irrigation Districts Organized for the Purpose of Co-Operating with the
Government of the United States under Terms of the Federal Reclamation Law and Other
Federal Laws and Repealing Existing Laws in Conflict Herewith, 1919 N.M. Laws 20 (codified
at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-10-1 to -47 (Michie 1978)).
16. Drainage District Act, 1912 N.M. Laws 84 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-7-1 to
-56 (Michie 1978)).
17. Acequia Act, 1874 N.M. Territorial Laws 10 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-2-1 to
-64 (Michie 1978)).
18. Water Users Association Act, 1909 N.M. Territorial Laws 76 (codified at N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 73-5-1 to -9 (Michie 1978)).
19. Irrigation District Act, 1919 N.M. Laws 41 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-9-i to

-62 (Michie 1978)).
20.

The Conservancy Act of New Mexico, 1923 N.M. Laws 140 (codified at N.M. STAT.

ANN. §§ 73-14-1 to -5 (Michie 1978)).
21.

The District was created by a district court order issued in In re Rio Grande

Conservancy Dist., No. 14,157 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26,1925).
22.

1923 N.M. Laws 140, § 202(1).

23. See Mary Humphrey, Comment, The New Mexico Conservancy Act 33 (Nov. 1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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resulted in dwindling downstream flows into the middle Rio Grande.2 As
an effect of the river's diminished carrying capacity, it deposited sediment
sooner, causing the riverbed to rise. The shallow water table simultaneously rose, and some otherwise dry land became waterlogged. Conversely, the resulting aggradation dried out what had been fertile ground,
as it became inaccessible to the shifting river channel. 25 Seasonal floodwaters had always coursed through the Middle Rio Grande Valley,
maintaining flood dependent ecosystems such as the cottonwood bosque.
Emerging land use patterns, however, increased competition between man
and nature for control of the valley.
As the river moved out of its steep canyon boundaries in northern
New Mexico, erosion caused by the cutting of mountain forests and the
clearing of lands along the watershed enhanced soil loads that washed onto
the broad plains of the middle valley where the river slowed.' At the time
the legislature passed the Conservancy Act, floods regularly threatened
valley populations from Cochiti Pueblo to Socorro.
Several failed attempts to organize drainage districts in the middle
valley under the existing Drainage District Act illustrated the distaste of
most local land owners for the idea of membership in a drainage district.'
However, others thought that drainage problems in the middle valley were
caused by the "primitive" irrigation works of the acequias.A small group
of Albuquerque business owners and property holders formed the Rio
Grande Association,' comprised of members of the Albuquerque Chamber
of Commerce, Albuquerque Kiwanis and Rotary dubs, and the Albuquerque Board of Realtors. Believing that the future economic viability of the
Middle Rio Grande Valley depended upon a reliable system of flood
protection and drainage, organizers pushed for approval of the Conservancy Act." The Association convinced the legislature to pass the
Conservancy Act in 1923. The enabling district court order in 1925 stated
the District's purposes:'
to regulate the stream channels of the Rio Grande and Rio
Chama and to regulate the flow of said streams.. .and thereby

24. See NaEmI & MCGucKiN, supra note 6, at 2.
25. See id.
26. Bosque-forest (or woods); in New Mexico bosque refers to primarily cottonwood
riparian forests planted by the periodic flooding of the Rio Grande and other streams.
27. see MDDLERIOGRANDE CONSERVANCY Dr., WATERPOCESPLAN 4, 5 (C.T. DuMarn
& S.C. Nunn eds., 1993) [hereinafter WATER POLCIES PLAN).
28. See Humphrey, supranote 23, at 27-28.
29. See id. at 29.
30. See WATER POUIGES PLAN, supra note 27, at 4.
31. In re Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., No. 14,157, slip op. at 2 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26,
1925).
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to reclaim, drain, or fill the wet and overflowed lands and to
protect public, municipal and private property from inundation and injury; and to reclaim and irrigate the arid and
unproductive lands adjacent to said rivers as herein described.3
The District was to accomplish these goals by erecting dams and
diversion channels33 in cooperation with the United States government and
federal reclamation law. At the time of the Conservancy Act, the economy
in the Rio Grande Valley centered on agriculture. (The District's original
boundaries have changed and now lie between Cochiti Dam-not yet in
existence when the District was created-in the north and the Bosque del
Apache Wildlife Refuge in the south.) The District's constituents, landowners in the Middle Rio Grande Valley, were to benefit from its services in
return for paying assessments to the District. The majority of them,
however, mostly farmers, opposed forming the District from its inception-fearing an inability to pay.'
The District's original scheme was to assess each tract of land in
proportion to the benefits received. This system of taxation was contrary
to the reasoning of the Reclamation Service. In its report on the project, the
Service maintained that because city property had higher economic value,
the large increment in that value that would be achieved by the construction of the plan meant that city property should bear a large share of the
costs. The report from the first benefit survey commissioned by the Rio
Grande Association, however, sought to encourage development by fixing
higher costs to lands that were not previously developed rather than to
those that were already improved.' This meant that agricultural lands,
with acreage reclaimed through drainage and more technical irrigation
facilities assessed at a much higher rate than those already in use, bore the
heaviest burden. Small farms, whose owners were predominantly the
descendants of early Spanish settlers, returned minimal profits.' Ultimately, the traditional farmers' fears were realized: they could not pay the
assessments. As a result, at least 40 percent of the District's constituents-formerly parciantesof the 72 acequiasthat existed in the middle valley
prior to the District's formation-lost their land and their water rights.37
In a broader sense, conflicts between customs governing acequia
systems and statutes defining water management within conservancy
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
See id.
See WATER POuciEs PLAN, supranote 27, at 4.
See Humphrey, supra note 23, at 29-31.
36. See WATER POLICIES PLAN, supra note 27, at 21 (quoting I.G. CLARK, WATER INNEw
MEXICO: A HISTORY OF ITs MANAGEMENT AND USE 387 (1987)).

37. See Humphrey, supra note 23, at 40.
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districts also initiated understandable resistance from traditional farmers.
Technical requirements were imposed upon people who practiced
irrigation in a communal system under rules that were understood without
being written down. The new order substantially narrowed the beneficiaries.' An instructive comparison may be found with California's experience. A study of the development of special districts in that state revealed
similar discrepancies between those who benefited and those who paid the
costs."

Problems existed even beyond the exclusion of some from the
benefits of water usage. Some irrigators were excluded from decisionmaking processes resulting in decisions that attributed costs to certain
groups disproportionately to the benefits received. "Key participants in the
district management were able to realize benefits disproportionate to their
investment by deferring costs to future users, manipulating levy assessment powers and securing federal or state subsidies for district operations
and development,"'. further demonstrating the insular nature of special
districts. Such partiality became apparent early in the District's formation.
In answer to and despite complaints from the District's harmed
constituents, the New Mexico Supreme Court declared the constitutionality
of the formation and organization of the District in 1925.1 The legislature
amended the Conservancy Act in 1927 to include additional provisions for
irrigation and agricultural benefits.' At the same time, legislators amended
the law to require more signatures for district formation. The Supreme
Court allowed the original organization of the District to stand, however,
because the Laws of 1927 contained a savings clause preserving the powers
granted to any conservancy district formed under the provisions of the

1923 Act.4
The Court surmised the only "material changes made are the
addition of.. .irrigation or reclamation as one of the purposes of said act
and the exclusion of certain portions of the state of New Mexico from the
effects thereof."" An added provision the Court did not address was that
which proclaimed: "[tihe rights of the district to the waters of the district,
or the use thereof, or the land within the district and property owned by it
shall not be lost by the district by prescription or by adverse possession, or

38. See, e.g., Tun De Young. Seariddngfor the Milagro Beanfield: The Politics of Surface Water
Management in New Mexico, PUB.SERVICE, Aug. 1981, at 1.
39. See id. at 2 (California shares pertinent similarities with New Mexico to the extent that
special districts have been used).

40. Id.
41.

See In re Proposed Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 242 P. 683 (N.M. 1925).

42. See 1927 N.M. Laws 45, § 201 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-14-4 Mdichie 1978)).
43. See 1927 N.M. Laws 45, § 910 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-17-23 (Michie 1978)).
44. Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 282 P. 1, 2 (N.M. 1929).
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for nonuse of the waters."' By exempting the District from current state
laws, this provision has ramifications today that could not have been
contemplated at the time. One result is a cloud over the state engineer's
jurisdiction.
RELEVANT STATUTES
As first declared in the state's Constitution, the waters of New
Mexico belong to the public, and "[blenefidal use shall be the basis, the
measure and the limit of the right to the use of water."' The state engineer
is vested with the responsibility of "supervision of waters of the state and
of the measurement, appropriation, distribution thereof and such other
duties as required." 7 The state engineer must administer the state's waters
in recognition of public welfare and conservation of water.' Accordingly,
he employs a number of tools to maintain the public interest in water in
New Mexico. A water right may be lost either through common law
abandonment or forfeiture.4' The forfeiture provision quashes speculatory
water appropriation by prohibiting water hoarding. Further, it provides the
state engineer with ongoing jurisdiction over the use of water rights,
allowing him to reallocate water for those uses that most benefit the public
welfare.
While abandonment of an appropriated water right requires a right
holder's intent to relinquish his claim, forfeiture of a right follows the
failure of an owner to perform some act required by statute.' The owner
may forfeit his right for failure to put water to beneficial use for a period
of four years. The New Mexico forfeiture statute was amended in 1965 to
require the state engineer to give notice prior to declaring a person's water
right relinquished under the statute. Therefore, notice must precede any
declaration of forfeiture of a right for a period of nonuse after 1965.51
The District holds two permits from the state engineer. One permit
was granted on the District's application to change the point of diversion
for 80,785 acres of irrigated land with perfected water rights.52 The District

45. 1927 N.M. Laws 45, § 908 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-17-21 (Michie 1978)).
46.

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1-1 to -2 (Michie 1978).

47. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-1 (Michie 1978).
48. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 72-5-5.1 (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1985).
49. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-28, 72-12-8 (Michie 1978). Section 72-5-28 applies to
forfeiture of surface water rights. Section 72-12-8 is the companion statute pertaining to
underground waters. This paper is primarily concerned with surface waters.
50. See, e.g., State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 308 P.2d 983,987-88 (N.M. 1957).
51. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28 (Michie 1978).
52. See WATER POUCIES PLAN, supra note 27, at 51 (permit No. 0602 on file with the state
engineer).
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retains another permit for surface water rights to irrigate 42,482 acres of
land.' The District also controls other waters, including those held by
contract with the Bureau of Reclamation and Pueblo federal reserved

rights.' Even though state law controls most of the water rights within the
District, the District, nonetheless, asserts that it cannot forfeit its permitted
rights.s Arguably, the nonuse provision of the Conservancy Act' (nonuse
provision) upon which the District bases its claim is directly contrary to
state common and statutory laws which protect the public interest in water
conservation. Furthermore, the nonuse provision may violate the New
Mexico Constitution on several grounds.
SPECIAL LAWS PROHIBITED
Section 24, article four of the New Mexico Constitution forbids the
legislature from passing local or special laws regulating county, precinct,
or district affairs. "[W]here a general law can be made applicable, no
special law shall be enacted. "' The New Mexico Supreme Court held the
Conservancy Act to be a general law in In re Proposed Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District.?e However, that case was decided prior to the 1927
changes to the Act, and the constitutionality of the nonuse provision within
the purview of section 24 of article four has not been brought before the
court. The New Mexico Supreme Court has described a general law as one
that treats all persons in the same circumstances alike60
The New Mexico Attorney General evaluated a proposed law
comparable to the Conservancy Act's nonuse provision and issued an
opinion that it would violate the Constitution's prohibition on special

53. See id. (permit No. 1690 on file with the state engineer).
54. See id. at 51-52.
55. See id. at 50.
56. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-17-21 (Michie 1978).
57. Some argue that conservancy districts' exemption from forfeiture is not unique in
New Mexico. They cite New Mexico's county and municipality planning statute. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9 (Michie RepL. Pamp. 1985). However, while that statute allows a 40-year
planning period without forfeiture, it recognizes "the state engineer's administrative policy
of not allowing municipalities and counties to acquire and hold, unused, water rights in an
amount greater than their reasonable needs within forty years,..." Id. This policy was
incorporated into law in 1983. Further, counties and municipalities must generate demand
numbers that will illustrate their needs for the next 40 years, and they must demonstrate that
this demand includes a conservation factor. See id. Aside from obvious distinctions between
the functions of the District versus those of a municipality which are the basis for the county
and municipality planning statute, the District cannot demonstrate any demand which falls
under its charter to justify the need to develop its water resources.
58. N.M. CoNsT. art. [V, § 24.
59. In re Proposed Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 242 P. 683,692 (N.M. 1925).
60. See id.
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legislation.61 The proposed statute would have provided carriage loss'
allowance for any artesian conservancy district established under the
provisions of defined statutes.' Similarly, the nonuse provision shelters
conservancy districts established under the Conservancy Act from loss of
their rights due to nonuse. The Attorney General opinion first noted that
there is a relatively small number of districts to which a grant of carriage

loss allowance would apply." This fact, the opinion reasoned, would make
the legislation apply only to a fairly narrow special group, but alone would
probably not render the statute unconstitutional.' The legislation's
unconstitutionality turned on the fact that artesian conservancy districts do
not make up a meaningful class with regard to carriage loss."
The Attorney General opinion recognized that "[elvery person who
uses water for irrigation purposes faces the problem of carriage loss, no
matter whether his water is derived from artesian sources, from surface
water, or from non-artesian underground sources."' To provide legislatively for protection from carriage loss only to those with water rights
within artesian conservancy districts unconstitutionally discriminates
against those with water rights outside the districts. "This is precisely the
type of legislation which New Mexico Constitution, Article IV, Section 24,
was designed to prevent. " s
Just as all irrigators face carriage loss, every water right holder in
New Mexico encounters the reality that his right may be lost to abandonment or forfeiture for nonuse. The protection offered by the nonuse
provision to those rights within the District is practically the same type that
the New Mexico Attorney General determined to be unconstitutional. The
provision favors the District and discriminates against those with water
rights outside its boundaries by not providing them with the same
protection. The District's water users, to which the nonuse provision solely
applies, do not constitute a meaningful class with regard to protection from
loss of their water rights. New Mexico's general laws governing water
rights-including abandonment and forfeiture---can, and should, apply to
those in the District.

61, 1971 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. No. 71-23 (1971).
62. Carriage loss is that amount of water lost between the point of appropriation and the
point of beneficial use. It is usually accounted for in the "duty of water" one is permitted to
divert from a source. See id. at 1.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 2-3.
65. See id. at 3.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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The Attorney General opinion further declared the proposed
carriage loss allowance to be unconstitutional under the separation of
powers doctrine of the New Mexico Constitution, suggesting that there is
another problem with the nonuse provision.' The opinion characterized
the granting of carriage loss allowance as the grant of an additional water
right. Citing New Mexico statutes placing exclusive jurisdiction over the
adjudication of water rights in the courts,7 the opinion concluded,
"[w]here exclusive jurisdiction has been given to the judiciary to determine
water rights, it is the opinion of this office that the separation of powers
doctrine forbids the legislature from granting any such rights. " ' By the
same argument, if the nonuse provision grants a water right where it
otherwise would no longer exist, the legislature has violated the separation
of powers doctrine of the New Mexico Constitution. This infringement
upon the judiciary has detrimental effects on New Mexico's water supply.
There are also policy reasons why the legislature should not grant
water rights. The judiciary was given exclusive jurisdiction over the
adjudication of water rights because there must be accountability for New
Mexico's limited waters. The use of water creates physical realities that
impact the state's land and streams. Water use cannot simply be prescribed
arbitrarily without measure. Water will not materialize from thin air with
the granting of a right to its use.
EQUAL PROTECTION
The New Mexico Constitution states that, "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws."' The city of Raton
brought a challenge to the nonuse provision founded on a violation of the
equal protection clause. In City of Raton v. Vermejo Conservancy District,'
Raton contended that section 73-18-21 (the nonuse provision) improperly
discriminates against other appropriators of water whose rights may be
lost by reason of nonuse while favoring a conservancy district's rights.'
The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the trial court,
concluding that the section does, indeed, preclude abandonment of a

69. N.M. ComST. art HI,§ 1 ("the powers of the government of this state are divided into
three distinct departments...and no person...charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one..,shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others").
70. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-4-17 (Michie 1978) (vesting this jurisdiction).
71. 1971 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. No. 71-23,4-5 (1971).
§ 18.
72. N.M. CONST. art. II,
73. City of Raton v. Vermejo Conservancy Dist., 678 P.2d 1170 (N.M. 1984).
74. See id. at 1174.
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conservancy district's water rights. 5 The court, without thorough analysis,
decided that the nonuse provision does not violate the equal protection
clause of the New Mexico Constitution. 6 Because the legislature created an
"entire body of law pertaining specifically to conservancy districts" to
facilitate performance of the purposes for which they were created, the
court concluded that section 73-17-21 must be a rational part of that
scheme.' The court resolved, "the state's unique and extensive regulation
of such districts ensures maximum beneficial use of water."' The court's
'reasoning hinges upon an assumption that the District is putting water to
beneficial use. With that assumption, the court held that the nonuse
provision was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
The New Mexico Supreme Court in McGeehan v. Bunch articulated
in more detail the standard of review for determining whether legislation
withstands an equal protection challenge. The court stated that the law is
constitutional where there is a rational and natural basis for the legislation,
"based on a substantial difference between those to whom it does and
those to whom it does not apply, and that it is so framed as to embrace
equally all who may be in like circumstances and situations."' Suggesting
the same technocratic bias against "primitive" acequia systems exhibited by
the organizers of the District, the court in City of Raton reasoned that
conservancy districts, because of their governing legislation, were not likely
to waste water. Therefore, conservancy districts were substantially
different from individual appropriators who may need managerial
oversight in order to assure beneficial use of water.
However, an examination of the facts surrounding the District's
use of water in the Middle Rio Grande Valley may reveal that beneficial use
is not guaranteed merely because a conservancy district holds those water
rights. In fact, the District asserts its power by diverting increasingly more
water from the river as competition for that water rises, disregarding other
needs. Where conservancy districts deprive appropriators throughout the
state of water and subsequently fail to put that water to beneficial use,
conservancy districts must be held to the same standards as all other water
users to ensure the beneficial use of water. In the language of the McGeehan
court, it does not follow that it is "natural" for the legislature to provide a
special law, the nonuse provision, sheltering the District from state
engineer oversight.

75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. McGeehan v. Bunch, 540 P.2d 238,240 (N.M. 1975) (quoting Gruschus v. Bureau of
Revenue, 399 P.2d 105,107 (N.M. 1965)).
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The underlying basis for the equal protection doctrine is the
principle that persons similarly situated shall receive like treatment.'
Further, the New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized that changed
circumstances may result in unfair classification. ' It may be true that in
1927 when the amended Conservancy Act was passed there was a rational
basis for the nonuse provision. Issues of water conservation in New Mexico
today, however, have created a new set of concerns.
Quantitative rights to water resources in New Mexico remain
poorly defined. With its state permitted rights, the District asserts the right
to irrigate almost 125,000 acres of land. This translates into a consumptive
use of about 258,861 acre-feet per year.' Its diversion rate-or duty of
water-is much higher still. It is critical to note that the District has
diverted more water from the Rio Grande in the past decade than ever
before, while irrigated acreage in the District has declined."
In recent practice, the District irrigates less than 60,000 acres.' In
the spring of 1996, however, the District diverted even more water than it
had for the same diversion period in the last decade." That spring, with
runoff at one of the lowest levels on record and confronting severe
drought, the District's response was not to conserve water, but to use it
even more heavily. The subsequent draining of a forty-five mile reach of
the river caused the deaths of a significant number of species in the area
including the taking of about 40 percent of the population of the endangered Rio Grande silvery minnow."
During the spring of 1996, each water user in New Mexico faced
the implications of water shortage, watching crops wilt and die due to a
scarcity of available surface water. Indeed, every year each parcianteof an
acequiaor member of a ditch association is threatened with the possibility
that when the land around him is no longer planted and falls from crop
production the appurtenant water rights will be lost. However, a District
farmer does not face this final threat. The rights are not lost in the District,
though each water user is confronted with the same set of circumstances.
The argument that rights in the District are put to beneficial use despite not
being used for irrigation is implausible. The nonuse provision should not

80. See id.
81. See id. at 242.
82. See WATER POuCIES PLAN, supranote 27, at 52.
83. The state engineer's current estimated average for consumptive use for irrigation in
the region is 2.1 acre-feet per year. Interview with Jess Ward, Water Resources Master, Office

of the New Mexico State Engineer,District I (Dec. 20,1999).
84. See NIEMI & MCGucKIN, supranote 6, at 86.

85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 87.
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withstand an equal protection challenge today without maximization of
beneficial use.
Inquiry may further show that not only are the District's waters not
put to beneficial use, but that they are, in fact, wasted. The District
acknowledges that its water rights permits have not been fully developed.'
It has reacted by frantically diverting water from the Rio Grande for the
seeming purpose of using its water rights. Mere diversion of water,
however, is not commensurate with beneficial use. The New Mexico
Supreme Court has established: "[no right to the use of water... [may be]
obtained by its use by [an appropriator] in violation of law, nor can it be.""
In New Mexico, "[b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the
limit of the right to the use of water....""
Despite the court's holding in City of Raton that the nonuse
provision precludes abandonment of a conservancy district's water rights,
the court did not squarely address whether it also precludes statutory
forfeiture. The District contends that it does.91 However, the strength of the
forfeiture statute would bolster a challenge to the nonuse provision.
Forfeiture of one's rights does not require intent upon the holder of the
rights.' The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that "[i]n fact a
forfeiture may be worked directly against the intent of the owner of the
right to continue in the possession and the use of the right.""° There is a
separate argument that even if the District cannot lose its rights as a result
of nonuse, it may forfeit its rights by abuse.
The Court observed in Erickson v. McLean that "[tlhe need for water
is imperative, and often the supply is insufficient. Such conditions lead
inevitably to many serious controversies, and demand from the state an
exercise of its police power, not only to ascertain rights, but also to regulate
and protect them."" It is an established principle in New Mexico water law
that whatever right one has, it shall not be injurious to the rights of others,
or of the general public."As implicitly recognized in the New Mexico Constitution, the
public welfare criterion in the New Mexico Water Code, and New Mexico
Supreme Court opinions, the public trust doctrine applies to the state's

88. See WATER POUdIES PLAN, supranote 27, at 53.
89.
90.

State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mitchell, 345 P.2d 744,746 (N.M. 1959).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (Michie 1978).

91.

See WATER POLIES PLAN, supranote 27, at 50.

92.

See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28 (Michie 1978).

93. State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 308 P.2d 983,987 (N.M. 1957).
94. Id.
95. See id.
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allocation of its waters." The principle of the doctrine recognizes that water
"is so essential that it must be held by the state in inalienable trust for
common use. The state has a duty to maintain and preserve [this resource]
for the public and enforces the public trust as a representative of the
public."' The public trust doctrine provides a basis for the consideration
of social and environmental values related to water use which are not
equitably represented in the market place."
The state of New Mexico exercised its police power for the health
and welfare of the public in enacting legislation authorizing the creation of
the District. Flood control and drainage provide broad reaching public
benefits. With those threats in check, the private interests of property
holders in the District, now a powerful minority, should not be protected
at the expense of current statewide public concerns. Decisions regarding
the use and control of water in New Mexico must not be delegated to
narrowly based groups or interests. The state engineer must be permitted
to exercise his authority to enforce the interests of the general public."
Recognizing the words of the New Mexico Supreme Court, that
"mere diversion of water into a canal or ditch, without applying water to
irrigating a crop or other valid use, does not satisfy the requirement of a
" the District has attempted to expand its uses of water by
beneficial use, " °°
establishing a water bank. In this way the District holds its unused water
rights for lease to others in the District to apply the rights in ways other
than irrigation." 1 It thereby can avoid the appearance of waste while
profiting from uses it has no statutory basis to effect.
The New Mexico public must decide whether this is the body,
acting through an undemocratically elected board,"° that it wishes to
entrust with the allocation of its most precious resource. The District's basic
accountability is to its electorate," which is, by definition, limited to

96. See N.M. CoN. art. XVI, § 2; N.M.STAT. ANN. § 72-5-5.1 (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1997).
See also Threlkeld v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex. rel. Otero County, 15 P.2d 671, 673 (N.M.
1932).

97. Consuelo Bokum, Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement in New Mexico's Water
Code, 36 Nat. Resources J.441, 445 (1996).

98. See id.
99. The New Mexico Supreme Court has noted that the police powers of the state extend
to the State Engineer Office. See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 800 P.2d 1061,1062 (N.M.

1990).
100. State ex rel.Martinez v. McDermett, 901 P.2d 745,749 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
101. See The Water Bank is Afloat, CONSERVANCY TODAY, Fall 1997, at 4,4.
102. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-14-48 to -88(Michie 1978) (governing election procedures
for the board of directors).
103. See WATER PouClFS PLAN, supranote 27, at 64.
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landowners within its territory. 1 4 In allowing the District to determine how

an unrivaled amount of water will be used in the middle valley, the public
permits what are essentially private interests to control the development of
water resources. Under this system, public values are sacrificed at the
discretion of the District.
By upholding the nonuse provision, the State is protecting private
interests in the District at the expense of recognized public welfare values
that characterize New Mexico and are integrally rooted in its history.
Protecting the District's water rights from forfeiture betrays the state's
public trust responsibility by giving priority to the economic interests of
few over the preservation of recognized cultural and environmental values
in New Mexico. The District, under this protection, may deal out its water
rights to competing development unchecked. This should not be allowed
to happen under New Mexico law.
The significance of a living culture was eloquently stated by the
district court judge in the case of In re Sleeper:. "The deep-felt and traditionbound ties of northern New Mexico families to the land and water are
central to the maintenance of that culture."' Under a public welfare
analysis, that opinion placed these values above those dependent upon a
transfer of water rights from a community ditch "in order to construct a
playground for those who can pay.""0 ' The cultural identity of northern
New Mexicans revolves around irrigation and has been identified as a
public trust interest. In the struggle for the use of New Mexico's waters,
this culture is at risk.
Based on the presumption that the state's surface water is overappropriated, limited sources of water in New Mexico pit separate public
welfare interests against each other. To the extent that New Mexicans now
give greater importance to environmental concerns, those interests must
arguably be considered by the state engineer in evaluating water rights
allocations. However, without access to the District's waters, those
advocating the protection of instream flows, for example, unnecessarily
threaten the rights of traditional water users. The nonuse provision places
protection of the District's water rights above any number of public welfare
concerns, and appears to be a corruption peculiar to New Mexico.
The nonuse provision is inconsistent with the Colorado Conservancy Act, a model for the New Mexico Conservancy Act.1e7 The Colorado

104. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-14-20i 47, 48, 57, 71 (Michie 1978). See also NIEMI &
MCGUCIN, supra note 6, at 87.
105. See Sleeper v. Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n, No. RA 84-53, slip op. at 6 (N.M. Dist.
Ct. Apr. 16,1985), rev'd on othergrounds, In re Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
106. Id. at 7.
107. See In re Proposed Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 242 P. 683,696 (NM. 1925).

Winter 2000]

MIDDLE RIO GRANDE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT

17

Act1" offers no protection to conservancy districts from abandonment of
their water rights. In fact, Colorado conservancy districts have lost their
rights for abandonment. 109 Further, the Wyoming Conservancy Act does
11
not protect conservancy districts' water rights from abandonment.
Wyoming does not differ from New Mexico in many of the basic principles
of western water law; it has adopted the prior appropriation system and its
conservancy district statutes are fairly comparable. The Wyoming and
Colorado statutes actually use the exact same language conferring power
to districts.m Without reasoning to support the Conservancy Act's nonuse
provision that may be unique to circumstances in New Mexico, there is no
explanation for its continued existence.
CONCLUSION
The nonuse provision of the Conservancy Act is unconstitutional

as it relates to several provisions of the New Mexico Constitution-most
glaringly, perhaps, the equal protection clause. Further, even if the nonuse
provision protects the District from loss of its rights due to nonuse, it may
not protect it from forfeiture under state statutory law for abuse of its water
rights. The New Mexico Supreme Court has vehemently protected the
state's waters from waste, contrary to the public interest in New Mexico.
Finally, the nonuse provision has no roots in the Colorado Act, which
served as a model for the New Mexico Act, and should not hold ground in
New Mexico. Water rights in this state are anchored in the New Mexico
Constitution, steadfastly protecting the public interest in a public resource.
Arguments from the District that it maintains public benefits must be
received with discriminating ears. Now that the reclamation era is gone,
and the danger of floods lies in the past, the District is floundering for a
purpose. Recent attempts to improve its public relations include the
District's claims that it is to'be credited for the existence of the bosque, a
natural resource treasured by residents of the middle valley.1 The District
has conspicuously prevented the passing of proposals, however, which
would revive the cottonwood forest by allowing a managed flood through

108.
109.

See CoLO.Rsv. STAT. §§ 3745-101 to -153 (1973).
See, e.g., Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Board of County

Comn'rs, 841 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Purgatoire River Water
Conservancy Dist., 818 P.2d 747 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
110. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-701 to -779 (Mchie 1977).
111. See CoLO.REv. STAT. § 37-45-134 (1973); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-749 (Michie 1977).
112. See, e.g., Cathy Robbins, The Middle Rio GrandeConservancyDistrict:The Most Important
Local Agency You Never Heard Of, CROSswINDS, July 1997, at 10.
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the bosque.l Because the middle valley's economy has moved away from
agriculture, the District's likely beneficiaries will be robots of industry (not
recognized cultural interests protected by the public trust in New Mexico).
Those are the interests that can pay in the newly evolving water market.
The District is an undemocratic agency. Its constituency is a small
and limited set of special interests. Yet, it enjoys state-sanctioned protection
at the expense of the rest of New Mexico's people. Those representing
public interests in water should be able to challenge the District's uses of
its water rights. Where there are findings of non-beneficial use, the
challenges to the nonuse provision presented here could potentially be
used to free some of the District's waters. The result would afford
opportunities to redefine water rights in New Mexico so that uses most
beneficial to the public welfare are maintained and private hoarding of
water resources is stopped.
In interpreting the role of public welfare related to water allocation,
state supreme court decisions in the West have demonstrated that courts
must not "merely rubber stamp agency or legislative actions," but must
also determine whether decisions managing water resources comply with
the public trust doctrine."1 The Idaho Supreme Court reiterates that the
"trust is a dynamic, rather than static, concept and seems destined to
expand with the development and recognition of new public uses."115 As
New Mexicans continue to recognize the value of preserving the state's
cultures and environment, the public trust doctrine provides a means for
protecting those interests.
The New Mexico legislature should not wait until the Middle Rio
Grande is adjudicated to revisit the nonuse provision. The District does not
have a right to use public waters contrary to public interests. The State
should put the District into the position of all other water users in New
Mexico by eliminating the nonuse provision.

113. While the bosque in its present form, a narrow strip along the channel of the Rio
Grande retaining little of its historical character, is partially attributable to the District's works
directing the river's flow, it is also true that the ancient cottonwoods are receding from lack
of water. See NIEMI & MCGUCKIN, supra note 6, at 3. The current stand of mature trees
germinated in 1941 when the last big flood rushed through the middle valley. See id. The
construction of Cochiti Dam in 1975 as part of the District's works restricted the floodplain
and has ended the potential for regeneration of cottonwoods. See id.
114. Bokum, supranote 97, at 443.
115. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441,447 n.2 (Idaho 1985) (quoting Roderick E. Walston, The
PublicTrust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA
CLARA L. Rsv. 62,66 (1982)).

